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AGGLOMERATION EFECTS AND STRATEGIC
ORIENTATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S.
LODGING INDUSTRY
LINDA CANINA
CATHY A. ENZ
Cornell University
JEFFREY S. HARRISON
University of Richmond
This study provides evidence regarding the strategic dynamics of competitive clusters.
Firms that agglomerate (co-locate) may benefit from the differentiation of competitors
without making similar differentiating investments themselves. Alternatively, co-
locating with a high percentage of firms with low-cost strategic orientations reduces
performance for firms pursuing high levels of differentiation. Further, the lowest-cost
providers with the greatest strategic distance from the norm of the competitive cluster
reap the greatest benefit from co-location with differentiated firms. We find empirical
support for these ideas using a sample of 14,995 U.S. lodging establishments, and
controlling for a number of key demand-shaping factors.
Competitive dynamics are defined by the moves
and countermoves of firms and their competitors
(Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001). Organizations do
not exist in a vacuum. They are inherently interde-
pendent. Consequently, it is useful to study the
strategic orientations of firms in the context of what
other firms are doing. For example, the effective-
ness of a particular strategy may depend on the
strategies pursued by other firms in the same mar-
ket (Mazzeo, 2002). Geographic clusters of firms are
common in many industries, and these clusters
provide an outstanding context in which to study
strategic orientations, especially to the extent that
the competitive dynamics of one cluster can be
compared to the dynamics of other clusters in the
same line of business (Chung & Kalnins, 2001;
Mazzeo, 2002).
One way to distinguish among the strategic ori-
entations of firms in a geographic cluster is by their
levels of differentiation. Differentiation involves an
attempt to create a product or service that is pre-
ferred over other offerings in a market (Caves &
Williamson, 1985; Porter, 1980: 37). It often in-
volves investments in superior fixed assets, raw
materials, component parts, or technology, as well
as comparatively high levels of service and adver-
tising. If differentiation is successful, then a firm
should be able to recover the additional costs
through an increased price and/or higher sales vol-
ume (Porter, 1985: 153). For example, Mazzeo
(2002) studied small motel markets and discovered
that there are strong incentives for firms to pursue
strategies that are different from competitors’ in
their local markets. An important issue is whether
a firm may enjoy some of the benefits associated
with the differentiating investments of others in
its cluster without making similar resource
investments.
The benefits that accrue from firm co-location are
known as “agglomeration effects.” In a study of the
hotel industry in Texas, Chung and Kalnins (2001)
discovered that in rural areas, chain firms and
larger firms contribute “positive externalities” from
their presence in competitive clusters. Independent
and smaller hotels are the net beneficiaries of these
externalities. Furthermore, Kalnins and Chung
(2004) found that new hotels are attracted to areas
with branded upscale hotels. Similarly, taking a
production perspective, Flyer and Shaver (2003)
used simulations to demonstrate that co-location
tends to occur in industries where early entrants
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have made large investments in research and de-
velopment or where research and development
spending is symmetric across firms. Unlike in joint
ventures, alliances, trade groups, and other inter-
organizational relationships, in industry clusters
firms can extract the benefits associated with these
externalities from other firms without their cooper-
ation or consent.
Our study contributes to this research stream by
demonstrating that high levels of differentiation in
a competitive cluster are associated with higher
levels of performance for firms in the cluster. Fur-
thermore, the improvement in a firm’s performance
varies as a function of the difference between the
strategic orientation of the firm and the average
strategic orientation of firms in the cluster. We also
find that locating in a competitive cluster with a
high percentage of companies with low-cost strate-
gic orientations tends to reduce performance for
firms with higher levels of differentiation. Our hy-
potheses result from combining concepts found in
research on agglomeration and differentiation
(Kalnins & Chung, 2004). The data used in the
study encompass an entire U.S. industry, as op-
posed to a single city (cf. Baum & Haveman, 1997)
or state (cf. Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Kalnins &
Chung, 2004). In addition, we provide new evi-
dence regarding the benefits of clustering among
large firms, following the work of Chung and
Kalnins (2001). We find that firms pursuing a low-
cost (economy) strategic orientation or a differenti-
ation (upscale) strategic orientation are the only
firms that enjoy the benefits of clustering with
larger firms.
THEORY OF AGGLOMERATION
The theory of agglomeration explains why com-
petitors often cluster in groups. Agglomeration is
counterintuitive from a traditional economic per-
spective since competition is typically reduces per-
formance. The hazards are well understood. Close
proximity can increase competition for supplies
such as labor, materials and capital. Exclusive tech-
nologies are harder to keep secret. Also, depending
on the product or service provided, demand may
need to be spread over more competitors. In fact,
Baum and Mezias (1992) discovered that localized
competitive influences increased failure rates in
the Manhattan hotel industry over much of the 20th
century. Nevertheless, as Porter (1998) pointed out,
agglomeration is not uncommon (see also Lomi,
1995). For example, competitive clusters exist in
entertainment (Hollywood), computer technology
(Silicon Valley), high-tech automobiles (southern
Germany), textiles (the Carolinas), and many other
industries. They are especially common in service
industries such as lodging, food, and retail, where
they exist in many locations throughout the world.
The characteristics of these competitive clusters
vary. For example, in Manhattan, exclusive retail
stores are mainly located on upper Madison Ave-
nue, while the discount stores tend to be located on
14th Street. However, both the Gap and Tiffany’s
are located at Copley Plaza in Boston.
It is tempting to assume that agglomeration is
primarily a result of natural advantages associated
with particular geographic locations. Such advan-
tages may include lower-cost factors of production
or proximity to necessary resources such as lumber,
waterways, or population centers. However, Elli-
son and Glaeser (1999) were only able to identify
natural advantages in about one-fifth of the clusters
they studied. Although they reasoned that includ-
ing more variables capturing such advantages
would have resulted in the identification of a
higher percentage of clusters with natural advan-
tages, they nonetheless admitted that other types of
factors seemed important in a number of highly
geographically concentrated industries. The litera-
ture on the economics of agglomeration suggests
that geographical clustering in an industry leads to
higher performance because of improved produc-
tion and/or heightened demand (Marshall, 1920:
273). We will briefly review the production argu-
ments and then focus on the demand benefits. In
addition, we will argue that the benefits that are
most important to firms in particular clusters de-
pend on the nature of their industries.
Production Advantages of Agglomeration
Much of the agglomeration literature has focused
on the benefits of production in proximity to close
competitors. For example, Henderson (1986) found
that industry localization can raise “factor produc-
tivity.” Such an increase may occur because com-
petitors in a cluster have access to resources that
are not readily available to competitors not in a
cluster (Shaver & Flyer, 2000; Tallman, Jenkins,
Henry, & Pinch, 2004). In this regard, Shaver and
Flyer (2000) discovered that firms with the weakest
resources in areas such as technology, human cap-
ital, training programs, suppliers, and distributors
tended to locate near stronger firms that made net
contributions to resource-based externalities in
their areas (see also Flyer & Shaver, 2003). Re-
sources such as advanced technical knowledge are
more easily transferred when competitors are in
close proximity (Pouder & St. John, 1996; Tallman
et al., 2004). Transfer is eased partially because
co-located firms draw from the same local pool of
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human resources with specialized skills and
knowledge (Almeida & Kogut, 1999). For instance,
Marshall (1920: 271) observed that workers with
required skills are more abundant for firms clus-
tered in a single area because potential employees
with the required skills are naturally drawn to such
an area.
Location in clusters can also allow greater access
to leading suppliers, special services, or special
relationships through interorganizational relation-
ships such as joint ventures (Dyer, 1996). Baum and
Oliver (1992) suggested that these types of relation-
ships not only benefit the firms involved in them,
but all firms in an industry, through increasing the
availability of resources as a whole. Of course, an
alternate view is that special relationships also
raise entry barriers, making it harder for new firms
to enter a market while protecting existing compet-
itors (Gomes-Casseres, 1994).
Many of the production-based agglomeration ar-
guments apply well to a technologically sophisti-
cated manufacturing industry such as automobiles
or computers, but not so well to a low-tech service
industry such as lodging, restaurants, or retail
stores. For example, sophisticated production re-
quires workers with specialized skills, whereas
low-tech service firms hire predominantly un-
skilled or semiskilled laborers (except for manage-
ment). Consequently, clustering may not as readily
offer labor pool benefits in these industries. The
same logic applies to technology transfer. Techno-
logical advances are more likely to spread among
firms that are in close proximity owing to informa-
tion leakage and employee transfer (Tallman et al.,
2004). Knowledge exchange is important to a tech-
nologically sophisticated manufacturing firm, but
less important to a low-tech service firm such as a
hotel or retail store. Similarly, sophisticated sup-
plies are important to high-tech manufacturers, but
low-tech service firms tend to use basic supplies
that are readily available. We acknowledge the ex-
istence of high-tech service industries, such as fi-
nancial services, that are likely to enjoy labor and
technology transfer benefits. However, the point of
this discussion is to demonstrate that the produc-
tion-based benefits of agglomeration do little to ex-
plain the tendency of service firms with simple
technologies and basic supply needs to cluster. To
explain this phenomenon better, we now turn to
demand-based theory.
Demand-Based Advantages of Agglomeration
Agglomeration can lead to benefits from in-
creased demand through reduced search costs for
consumers (Marshall, 1920: 273). These benefits
are more important in industries with a high level
of product heterogeneity because they require the
largest amount of consumer search (Fischer & Har-
rington, 1996). Co-location allows consumers to
evaluate a variety of offerings without leaving an
area. Consequently, geographic areas with a large
selection of competing services are more attractive
to consumers. These benefits are not a result of
resource spillovers such as those found in manu-
facturing firms. Instead, they are a result of firm
heterogeneity that attracts more consumers to an
area simply because the area has a wider variety of
firms from which to choose (Marshall, 1920: 273).
This effect is particularly important in service in-
dustries because the location itself is an insepara-
ble part of the service provided, such as in a “mega-
mall” of retail establishments.
From the firm perspective, co-location allows
closer monitoring of competitors and the ability to
respond to specific competitor moves. This advan-
tage is similar in concept to the technology transfer
benefit associated with manufacturing clusters. An-
other source of advantage in competitive clusters is
what might be called “differentiation spillover.”
Just as a manufacturing firm might enjoy advan-
tages from the investments in infrastructure and
technology of competing firms in a cluster (relative
to firms not found in the cluster), so also a service
firm may benefit from the investments of competi-
tors that make a location more attractive. Location
is especially important to service firms. It is made
even more important because it is a resource that is
nonrenewable. It is also interesting to note that the
first firm to enter a particular location may do
much to create an advantage for the competitors
that follow.
Unlike the heightened demand gains of heteroge-
neity, which firms in a cluster universally share,
regardless of their individual strategic orientations,
differentiation spillover effects are likely to benefit
some firms more than others (Shaver & Flyer,
2000). For example, a firm may enjoy demand ben-
efits, such as higher prices, as a result of other
firms’ high levels of investment in product differ-
entiation. On the other hand, a highly invested firm
may incur an additional cost in the form of lower
achievable prices as a result of the lack of invest-
ment made by other firms in its cluster.
Product differentiation is a common dimension
firms use to distinguish themselves in an attempt to
reduce the effects of direct competition. According
to Porter, “A firm differentiates itself from its com-
petitors when it provides something unique that is
valuable to buyers beyond simply offering a low
price. Differentiation allows a firm to command a
premium price, to sell more of its product at a given
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price, or to gain equivalent benefits such as greater
buyer loyalty during cyclical or seasonal down-
turns” (1985: 120). Differentiation often comes with
increased costs, so a firm enjoys success with this
strategy if the price it gains from differentiation
exceeds the costs of creating it.
Many of the arguments underlying the theory of
differentiation imply that a firm that pursues dif-
ferentiation can retain its economic benefits. Oth-
erwise managers might not have sufficient motiva-
tion to expend additional resources to differentiate.
However, this assumption is violated by the obser-
vation that other firms may quickly imitate the
innovations of leading firms (Barney, 1991). In
these situations, a follower firm achieves some of
the benefits while absorbing fewer of the costs. At
the conceptual level, agglomeration is another ex-
ample of following the leader, as one firm locates in
an area and others follow.
Differentiation within Competitive Clusters in the
Lodging Industry
A closer look at sources of differentiation
through the lens of the lodging industry will help
explain how the benefits of differentiation can be
shared through agglomeration in a service setting.
From this point forward, many of our examples
will be based in the lodging industry, since we
tested our theory in this industry. The lodging in-
dustry is an especially good context in which to
study agglomeration effects because there are so
many clusters, and the characteristics of those clus-
ters can be compared (Chung & Kalnins, 2001;
Mazzeo, 2002). However, similar illustrations
could be drawn from other service industries. We
are focusing on the demand-based effects of ag-
glomeration because they are especially applicable
to services, whereas the production-based effects
are more relevant in manufacturing.
Porter (1985: 154) argued that differentiation
grows out of a firm’s chain of value-adding activi-
ties and that virtually any of these activities can be
a source of differentiation. Similarly, MacMillan
and McGrath suggested that a company “has the
opportunity to differentiate itself at every point
where it comes in contact with its customers—from
the moment customers realize that they need a
product or service to the time when they no longer
want it and decide to dispose of it” (1997: 133). In
the lodging industry, differentiation is possible
through taking reservations, providing close prox-
imity to attractive locations, transporting guests,
providing parking services, checking guests in and
out, handling baggage, servicing rooms, providing
in-room guest services such as phone lines, mo-
dems, video entertainment, and food, and provid-
ing special services like dry cleaning, meeting
rooms, a business center, or spa facilities (this is
not intended to be a complete list). Although it is
clear that the ways in which these activities are
conducted can differentiate a firm, it is less clear
that differentiation on any one service dimension
would be sufficient to provide benefits to firms that
locate in the same area. The one exception may be
locating in an area with a favorable proximity to
attractions such as theme parks or natural settings;
however, the first firm to open in such a location
did not create this advantage. Rather than a single
service dimension, it is the sum of activities and
how firms carry them out that create a level of
differentiation that can provide benefits for other
hotels in their cluster.
Strategic Agglomeration Benefits and Detriments
The demand-based advantages of locating among
differentiated firms can come from a variety of
sources. The presence of luxury and higher-end
hotels, because of their service quality, architec-
tural features, and reputations (to name but a few
factors) increases the attractiveness of an area as a
destination. For example, a tourist or business trav-
eler is more likely to have a favorable impression of
an area because of the presence of the product and
service attributes of differentiated higher-end ho-
tels. The lodging industry is fairly well structured
within each market with regard to pricing and the
quality and number of services provided (Mazzeo,
2002). A luxury hotel will offer a very wide range of
high-quality services, while an economy hotel will
offer limited services and a low price. Consumers
look for signals with regard to the level and quality
of services they expect to receive. One of the major
signals is branding. Firms can use a brand name,
such as the Ritz-Carlton or Budget Inns, to shape a
consumer’s expectations for a hotel that the con-
sumer has not yet visited (Ingram, 1996; Werner-
felt, 1988). Nonetheless, independent hotels can be
perceived as equivalent or superior to branded ho-
tels. For example, The Breakers in Palm Beach is
widely regarded as equal or superior to branded
hotels in that market. Pricing and the types and
quality of services provided are indicators of differ-
entiation that apply across all types of lodging
properties. They also create a set of expectations in
guests with regard to what they will experience.
Of course, potential consumers must be aware of
the quality of hotels in an area if firms are to enjoy
the benefits of co-location, such as increased de-
mand (Catrett & Lynn, 1999). Consumers achieve
awareness through a variety of sources. For exam-
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ple, they are guided by widely used rating services
and guidebooks such as those provided by Mobil
and the Automobile Association of America (AAA).
In addition, firms that differentiate are likely to do
more advertising so that they can generate enough
revenues to cover increased costs. This advertising
enhances reputation for an area, which can directly
increase demand. Travel agencies, although declin-
ing in influence, also provide a lot of location in-
formation to consumers. The Internet, which is
increasing in importance, has replaced travel agen-
cies as a primary information source for many con-
sumers. Consumers can click on a location and get
excellent descriptions of all the lodging properties
there. Consumers can also experience a location in
person. If they are well satisfied, they are more
likely to return, and differentiation should lead to
higher satisfaction levels. All of these factors can
increase the performance of hotels in a competitive
cluster.
Although positive externalities of differentiation
exist, not all the firms in a cluster will benefit
equally (Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Shaver & Flyer,
2000). Higher-quality product providers are more
likely to provide agglomeration benefits within a
cluster, while those at the other end of the product
segment continuum, the lowest-quality providers,
will capture the greatest benefits. This inequity is
due to the costs of differentiation and the associ-
ated high prices that must be obtained in order to
recoup those costs. Differentiation can be expen-
sive to pursue. In the lodging industry, a luxury
classification entails expensive architectural, de-
sign, and operating system features such as marble
staircases, state-of-the-art recreational facilities,
high-tech entertainment and communications sys-
tems, costly art, expensive bedding, and larger
rooms. Upscale hotels often provide extensive
meeting and convention facilities that are both la-
bor- and capital-intensive. Lower-end hotels can be
the beneficiaries of these investments when their
customers use the public facilities of higher-end
hotels while staying in closely proximate low-cost
operations.
Luxury and upscale hotels must charge higher
room rates to recover the additional expenses asso-
ciated with differentiating their products. How-
ever, lower-end hotels in the same markets are not
burdened by the same cost factors. Consequently,
they may enjoy the benefits of existing in an attrac-
tive market while keeping their prices relatively
low. A value-conscious consumer will perceive the
lower-priced hotels as bargains compared to com-
peting hotels in the area. This should result in
higher demand for the bargain hotels, as well as
prices that are higher than they would be if the
high-quality hotels did not exist. Consequently,
one might expect that lower-end hotels in compet-
itive clusters characterized by a high level of dif-
ferentiation would have higher performance than
lower-end hotels in other clusters. Firms are ex-
pected to select locations where the benefits of
agglomeration should be maximal, given their own
strategic orientations (Flyer & Shaver, 2003;
Kalnins & Chung, 2004).
Hotel properties are classified on the basis of the
extent of their quality and service differentiation
(Mazzeo, 2002). The classifications are an indica-
tion of the “credible commitment” made by firms to
a particular level of service quality (Ingram, 1996).
In addition, hotels remain in their service quality
groups over time because chains try to create and
sustain a “specific image through the quality of
amenities and services they provide” (Rushmore &
Baum, 2001: 165). Widely used classifications in
the industry include five levels: luxury, upscale,
midscale with food and beverage services, midscale
without food and beverage services, and economy.1
In keeping with the foregoing discussion, we ex-
pected lower-quality, limited-service hotels to en-
joy agglomeration benefits by locating in markets
with more higher-quality incumbents than lower-
quality ones. We expect to find this effect for all
quality segments below the luxury level. That is,
upscale properties will enjoy benefits from locating
in clusters with higher proportions of luxury ho-
tels, midscale properties will gain from locating
with higher proportions of luxury and upscale ho-
tels, and so forth. Given these arguments, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is appropriate:
Hypothesis 1a. Demand-based performance
will increase for all firms below the most highly
differentiated segment as a function of the pro-
portion of other firms co-locating in the same
geographic cluster that are pursuing greater
levels of differentiation.
We expect that the opposite argument will hold
for luxury firms located in close physical proximity
to firms pursuing a low-cost strategic orientation.
Competitors with such a strategic orientation do
not contribute as much to the attractiveness of a
location because they do not offer the range of
1 To assure that the classification used in this study
was appropriate, we compared the expert placement of
brands into these five classifications by four different
industry expert groups—HVS International, Smith
Travel Research, Bear Stearns, and Morgan Stanley.
These independent sources were consistent and conver-
gent on the lodging brands they placed in each of the five
categories.
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products and services from which competitors can
benefit. If many lower-cost providers are found in
the same competitive cluster, spillover effects will
be negative for those firms pursuing the highest
levels of differentiation in the cluster. In short,
firms that pursue a high level of differentiation
contribute to the positive agglomeration effects of
others, but when in close proximity to low-cost
providers, they suffer a loss from agglomeration.
Hypothesis 1b. Demand-based performance
will decrease for the most highly differentiated
firms as a function of the proportion of other
firms co-locating in the same geographic clus-
ter pursuing a lower-cost strategic orientation.
Support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b would suggest
that the differentiation-related characteristics of
clusters are associated with varying levels of firm
performance, depending on the strategic orienta-
tion of a firm. These hypotheses capture both the
beneficial and detrimental performance outcomes
of co-location. The major insight rests on exploring
the degree to which strategic orientation can en-
hance or detract from location choice. If, as we have
just argued, some firms give, while others receive,
benefits from the strategic orientations of other
companies in their local markets, a logical next step
is to explore who benefits the most. We now turn to
the question of the degree of strategic distance,
defined as the difference from the typical strategic
orientation of firms in a cluster, that will yield the
greatest demand-based benefits.
Being Different: The Advantage of Strategic
Distance
According to our previous arguments, positive
externalities exist for firms that co-locate with
firms that have a strategic orientation of high dif-
ferentiation, while the latter give but do not get
benefits from co-location. In addition, the magni-
tude of the difference in strategic orientation is
likely to amplify positive benefits for firms that are
experiencing demand enhancement in their clus-
ters. In particular, we argue that firms will reap the
greatest benefits when they are farthest in strategic
distance within a cluster of more highly differenti-
ated firms. In this case, being different amplifies
the positive benefits for firms with a low-cost stra-
tegic orientation.
For example, if a firm is pursuing a low-cost
strategic orientation, then a greater distance be-
tween that strategic orientation and the average
strategic orientation in the cluster means that the
cluster is characterized by a higher average level of
differentiation. Assume, for instance, that there are
two economy hotels, each in different competitive
clusters we will call A and B. Cluster A is made up
primarily of higher-end hotels, and Cluster B con-
tains primarily middle- or lower-end hotels. The
economy firm in Cluster A should have higher ag-
glomeration-based performance than the firm in
Cluster B because Cluster A contains more highly
differentiated firms and is therefore more attractive
to consumers. Furthermore, we argue that the ag-
glomeration benefit is even greater for the economy
hotel in cluster A because the strategic distance
between the dominant cluster orientation and that
of the low-end hotel is greater than it is in cluster B.
We suggest that two competitive advantages are
working simultaneously. First, the low-cost provid-
ers experience agglomeration benefits from a large
proportion of other firms with greater levels of dif-
ferentiation. By association—by their presence in
the cluster—they reap a revenue premium. Second,
if these firms’ strategies are the most distant from
the typical strategies in their cluster, they can le-
verage a real difference. The agglomeration effect
differentiates the cluster, and the distance from the
norm measures the difference between a focal
firm’s strategic orientation and the average strategic
orientation in the demand-enhancing cluster. The
benefits of differentiation spillover and firm differ-
ence combine to enhance demand-based perfor-
mance. To capture the enabling and enhancing ef-
fect of strategic distance, we propose:
Hypothesis 2a. Demand-based performance
will increase for firms pursuing the lowest-cost
strategic orientation as a function of the dis-
tance between their strategic orientation and
the average strategic orientation in their com-
petitive clusters.
The reverse argument should hold true for the
most highly differentiated hotels. Less distance be-
tween a highly differentiated firm and the norm in
the cluster means that the cluster is characterized
by hotels that are more highly differentiated. Direc-
tion of strategic benefit is important because the
most highly differentiated firms do not gain de-
mand-enhancing benefits from being in a cluster
with lower-end firms. Hence, the farther the strate-
gic distance for higher-end providers, the more
likely that the negative impact of agglomeration
stated in Hypothesis 1b will be magnified:
Hypothesis 2b. Demand-based performance
will decrease for firms pursuing the most
highly differentiated strategic orientation as a
function of the distance between their strategic
orientation and the average strategic orienta-
tion in their competitive clusters.
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In sum, we argue that strategy-based agglomera-
tion effects are magnified by strategic distance from
the norm: hotels pursuing a high-differentiation
strategic orientation experience agglomeration det-
riments that are amplified by distance from the
norm of the other hotels in their cluster, whereas
hotels pursuing a low-cost strategic orientation ex-
perience agglomeration benefits that are augmented
by distance from the norm of the other hotels.
METHODS
Data Sources
The sample used for this study was obtained
from Smith Travel Research, an independent re-
search organization that tracks lodging perfor-
mance for all major North American hotels. This
organization’s data are the most comprehensive
available on the industry, and were obtained
through a strict and exclusive data-sharing arrange-
ment. The data capture hotels across the entire
United States, including over 98 percent of the
chain hotel inventory, and are thus representative
of the entire U.S. lodging population for branded
hotels. Many independent hotels are also included
in the database. They constitute a total of 1,162
firms in the sample.
The Smith Travel data consisted of monthly ho-
tel-level performance data—room revenue and
rooms sold for the year 2000. In addition, Smith
Travel supplied categorical variables that describe
some of the characteristics of each firm. These data
included (1) the number of rooms in a hotel, (2) the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in which the
hotel was located, (3) the more narrowly defined
market tract in which the hotel was located, (4) the
location type of the hotel, which could be urban,
suburban, airport, highway, or resort, (5) the re-
gional location of the company owning the hotel,
and (6) the product/service quality segment cate-
gory of the hotel (these variables will be clarified
later). In addition, we collected U.S. Census Bureau
data by MSA on population and area. Counts of
state or county retail, service, and manufacturing
establishments were obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s County Business Patterns. Incomplete
data for 6 hotels reduced the sample from
15,001 to the final sample of 14,995 lodging
establishments.
Primary Variables
Agglomeration effects were measured at the tract
level. The data provider, Smith Travel Research,
identifies the location of a hotel by both MSA and
tract. Tracts, as defined by Smith Travel, are a
subset of a Metropolitan Statistical Area market
and are defined by counties and/or zip codes. For
example, the Boston MSA is divided into 10 tracts.
A total of 550 tracts currently exist in the United
States. The average number of lodging properties in
the tracts in our sample was 27.9; the minimum
number was 2, and the maximum was 74. Tracts
provide a more refined geographic unit for studying
agglomeration than MSAs since they better reflect
the realistic options available to a consumer who
desires to visit a particular location. Since Smith
Travel would not reveal the actual identity or exact
location of individual properties, even under the
exclusive agreement that allowed access to other
data, the tract was the smallest location grouping
available. For the sake of consistency with our the-
ory sections, we will refer to tracts as “competitive
clusters” or simply “clusters.”
For our test of Hypothesis 1a, we measured the
proportion of lodging properties in a cluster that
were pursuing a higher differentiation (i.e., prod-
uct-quality) strategic orientation. Hypothesis 1b re-
quires that agglomeration be measured as the pro-
portion of lodging properties in a cluster that are
pursuing a lower-cost strategic orientation. We
adapted the Bear Stearns Financial Services Com-
pany’s U.S. lodging industry categorization scheme
to classify hotels into product segments (Adler &
Lafleur, 1997; Dube´, Enz, Renaghan, & Siguaw,
1999). This scheme, which is stable over time and
allows brand and individual hotel comparisons,
divides the industry into five segments based upon
important differences in product and service offer-
ings. Hotels that offer full-service products operate
food and beverage facilities and meeting facilities,
and they have expensive guest services and amen-
ities. These full-service hotels are divided into
three categories based on quality: luxury, upscale,
and midscale with food and beverage. Hotels with
limited-service offerings do not operate food and
beverage facilities and provide relatively few guest
services and amenities. Limited-service hotels are
divided into two categories: midscale without food
and beverage, and economy. Table 1 gives an over-
view of the segment categorization scheme and ex-
amples of brand categories.
For Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we measured the dis-
tance between a firm’s strategic orientation and the
central tendency of the strategic orientations of
other firms in the cluster. To measure central ten-
dency, we assigned each strategy type a number
from 1 (“economy”) to 5 (“luxury”). We then cal-
culated the average strategic type in the cluster.
The distance score was the absolute value of a
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firm’s own value minus the cluster’s central
tendency.
One of the most important performance measures
in the lodging industry is revenue per available
room, commonly called “RevPAR” (Chung &
Kalnins, 2001; Ismail, Dalbor, & Mills, 2002). This
indicator serves as the basis for long-term business
planning and is used as a guide by investors and
hotel owners and general managers. In addition, a
measure such as revenue per available room is ap-
propriate for a service context and our theory. Ear-
lier we explained that production-based agglomer-
ation benefits fit a manufacturing setting well,
while demand-based advantages should be the pri-
mary driver of agglomeration in service businesses
such as hotels, restaurants, and retail establish-
ments. We then developed theory that explains
how spillover effects from cluster differentiation
are expected to influence demand at a firm level.
RevPAR is a demand-based, firm-level measure.
We would have preferred to use multiple mea-
sures of performance (i.e., performance measures
net of costs such as operating profit or net income),
but they were not available to us. However, we
have reason to believe that in many cases revenue
per available room is closely related to other per-
formance measures such as operating profit. To test
this notion, we obtained a smaller proprietary data
sample of 486 hotels that contains annual measures
of revenue and net income per available room for
the year 2001. The data were provided to us by PKF
Consulting’s Hospitality Research Group. The Pear-
son correlation coefficient between net income per
available room and RevPAR was .65 (p  0.0001).
Obviously, there is not perfect correlation between
these measures, but the strong correlation suggests
that the RevPAR measure is linked to other perfor-
mance measures that take into consideration the
costs of operation. In addition, some of the error in
this correlation may be explained by the fact that
the data were not divided by strategy segment, and
profit margins differ by segment owing to cost dif-
ferences. To minimize these segment cost structure
differences to some extent, we controlled for costs
by conducting separate hypothesis tests for each of
the five strategy segments. Revenue per available
room was calculated by dividing total room reve-
nue by the number of rooms available for sale. We
summed monthly revenues for a year and divided
by the annual number of rooms available. Monthly
data were aggregated to the annual level as a means
to eliminate seasonal fluctuations within clusters.
Control Variables
Many factors other than co-location impact the
revenue performance of a lodging firm. Chung and
Kalnins (2001) found that hotels in rural areas en-
joyed superior performance when competitors in a
cluster were larger than themselves. We therefore
added a size-based agglomeration variable to the
models to help establish the unique contribution of
the differentiation-based agglomeration variable
and the theory that surrounds it. This addition was
especially important because we understand that
size and differentiation are and should be related to
TABLE 1
Overview of Product-Quality Segmentation of the Lodging Industrya
Industry Sector and Quality Levels Characteristics of Quality Levels
Number of
Brands
Brand
Exemplar
Full service
Luxury Elegant; distinctive; highest-quality decor; upscale restaurants;
full range of first-class amenities and customized services.
4 Four Seasons
Upscale Well-integrated decor; quality furnishings; premium guest-
room amenities and facilities; high staff to guest ratio.
31 Crowne Plaza
Midscale with food and beverage Nicely appointed rooms; range of facilities; good-quality
amenities; some special services available; restaurants.
18 Holiday Inn
Limited service
Midscale with no food and beverage Nicely appointed rooms; range of facilities may be limited;
good-quality amenities.
21 Hampton Inn
Economy Clean and comfortable; minimum of services and amenities. 56 Days Inn
a Sources: Bear Stearns, Smith Travel Research, and Dube´ et al. (1999).
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each other; however, we believe that differentia-
tion-based agglomeration effects will be a consis-
tent predictor of performance even after size is
accounted for. We controlled for size-based ag-
glomeration effects by measuring the proportion of
hotels in a cluster that were larger in size than a
focal firm, measuring size as number of rooms.
We also added a control for within-cluster prod-
uct-quality heterogeneity (strategic dispersion). In
our theory section, we argued that heterogeneity is
one of the reasons a competitive cluster is attractive
to potential consumers. By controlling for hetero-
geneity within clusters, we could better test for the
firm-level differentiation spillover effects that were
the primary focus of this study. However, the in-
clusion of such a measure was also a test to deter-
mine whether such heterogeneity really matters, as
much of the research on agglomeration suggests.
We created a Herfindahl-type index that measured
the level of concentration or dispersion of strategy
types in a given cluster. To do so, we tallied the
number of hotels in each product-quality category,
then divided each tally by the total number of ho-
tels in the cluster. We squared each of these pro-
portions and then summed them. High values sug-
gest that the cluster is concentrated with respect to
strategic orientation; low values suggest that the
cluster is strategically dispersed. We also con-
trolled for size dispersion with the coefficient of
variation, calculated as the standard deviation of
within-cluster size divided by the mean.
Although the data provider would not provide
the exact identity of hotels, they did provide sev-
eral other items of information from which we
could create control variables. Four characteristics
of each hotel were provided: its size (number of
rooms), whether it was brand affiliated, its location
type, and its geographic region.
Typically, large hotels are more expensive than
small hotels and charge higher prices, resulting in a
positive relationship between revenue per avail-
able room and size (Chung & Kalnins, 2001). Chung
and Kalnins (2001) also found increased room rev-
enues for hotels in rural areas with a high percent-
age of chain hotels in their markets. These findings
may indicate that chains draw consumers to rural
areas, perhaps through their advertising and brand
recognition. Similarly, Ingram (1996) discovered
that hotels were more likely to survive if they were
associated with a brand. Consequently, we con-
trolled for chain affiliation with a dummy variable
(1, “brand affiliated”; 0, “independent”). With re-
gard to the location of a hotel, urban and resort
locations are expected to have higher revenue per
available room on average than suburban, airport,
and highway locations. Dummy variables were cre-
ated for each of the setting categories, with 1 signi-
fying that a hotel belonged to the category and 0
that it did not. We also expected hotels in highly
populated regions with expensive real estate to
have higher revenue per available room than hotels
in more sparsely populated regions. For example,
the cost of hotels in New England and in the Pacific
regions may be greater than the cost in central U.S.
areas. As for location type, we created dummy vari-
ables to capture region (New England, mid Atlan-
tic, south Atlantic, north central, south central,
west north central, west south central, mountain,
and Pacific).
A few other demand-related variables were mea-
sured for each metropolitan area. They included
the population, the land area in square miles, and
the sum of the number of retail, service, and man-
ufacturing establishments for the metropolitan area
to which a hotel belonged.
Statistical Methods
We used a feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS) procedure to test our hypotheses because of
the potential for “nonspherical” errors (Greene,
2000). If we had omitted a possible agglomeration
variable or a control variable that explained a por-
tion of the variability in revenue per available room
across clusters that was orthogonal to the other
cluster-level independent variables, then this vari-
ability would be included in the variability of the
disturbance term (Chung & Kalnins, 2001). As a
result, the within-cluster disturbance terms would
be correlated. Since there was more than one ob-
servation per cluster, the covariance matrix was
likely nonspherical, violating a condition of ordi-
nary least squares regression. Failure to use statis-
tical methods that accounted for this dependence
across observations within a cluster could have
resulted in erroneous conclusions (Greene, 2000).
Appropriate testing of Hypotheses 1a and 1b re-
quired that we separately test the competitive ben-
efits of each strategic category in each class of hotel
(economy through luxury). Testing at the level of
strategic orientation versus the industry (overall)
level was necessary to accurately capture the ben-
efits or detriments of agglomeration by strategic
orientation. As explanation, consider a situation in
which a low-end hotel pursing a low-cost strategic
orientation is located in the same cluster as a high-
end hotel pursuing a differentiation strategic orien-
tation. If the low-end hotel has an average room rate
of $50 and the high-end hotel’s average rate is $300,
then the only way the low-end hotel could have
higher revenue per available room than the high-
end hotel is if its occupancy is six times higher.
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Since 100 percent is the highest possible occu-
pancy rate, the high-end hotel would have to be
nearly empty for this to happen. Although this is an
extreme example, it demonstrates that the revenue
of low-end hotels will never exceed that of high-
end hotels. Consequently, the relevant comparison
is among hotels with the same strategic orientation.
By comparing hotels by strategic orientation across
clusters, we were able to discern the effects from
the characteristics of those clusters.
To demonstrate empirically the importance of
dividing our sample by strategic segment, we tested
for segment moderating effects, calculating F-tests
on the intercept across segments and on the slope
coefficient for the proportion of high-end proper-
ties across segments. These tests were accom-
plished by including dummy variables for each
segment and including an interaction term between
each of the segment dummy variables and the pro-
portion of high-end properties in the overall regres-
sion equation. The F-statistic on the differences in
the intercepts was 557.74 (p  .0001), and the
F-statistic on the differences in the coefficient for
the proportion of high-end properties across seg-
ments was 41.90 (p  .0001). In addition, all of the
segment dummy variables and all of the interaction
variables were significant at p  .05 or below.
These results suggest that strategic segment moder-
ates the relationship between agglomeration effects
and performance, an indication of the importance
of conducting separate tests by segment.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and corre-
lation coefficients for all of the variables for the
entire sample of 14,995 firms. The correlation co-
efficient between revenue per available room and
the proportion of properties in the cluster pursuing
high differentiation is negative and significant.
This finding is to be expected because the overall
correlation test does not account for segment dif-
ferences, which means that luxury hotels are com-
pared directly with economy hotels. The negative
correlation coefficient is another indication of the
importance of both controlling for segment in the
overall model and dividing firms by strategic cate-
gory before testing Hypothesis 1a.
Another relationship that is worthy of explana-
tion is the high (.91) correlation between the two
primary agglomeration variables. Recall that the
differentiation-based variable measures the propor-
tion of hotels that are pursuing a higher level of
differentiation, and the low-cost variable measures
the proportion of hotels that are pursuing a low-
cost orientation. Consequently, the two variables
are opposite ways of measuring the same basic
phenomenon. Inclusion of both variables in the
study is necessary because, by definition, there are
no hotels that are more highly differentiated than
those in the luxury category. Therefore, since the
differentiation-based variable is 0 for all luxury
hotels, Hypothesis 1a could not be tested for the
luxury category with this variable. Instead, it was
necessary to use the low-cost variable to conduct
the test for luxury firms (Hypothesis 1b). The two
variables are never included in the same model at
the same time.
Table 3 presents FGLS models for all five seg-
ments. In Hypothesis 1a, we predict that hotels gain
differentiation-based agglomeration benefits from
spillover through co-locating with hotels that pur-
sue high levels of differentiation. We found support
for this hypothesis in all four segments for which
it was appropriate (economy through upscale). In
these models, coefficients for the proportion of
properties in the cluster pursuing high differentia-
tion are consistently positive and significant. These
results indicate that positive agglomeration effects
result from co-location in an industry cluster with a
high percentage of firms pursuing differentiation.
The overall model at the far right of Table 3 in-
cludes all firms below the luxury level and dummy
variables to control for segment effects. Consis-
tently with the tests for Hypothesis 1a, the coeffi-
cient for the proportion of properties pursuing high
differentiation is positive.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that luxury firms will
suffer negative effects from co-location in clusters
with a high proportion of less differentiated com-
petitors. The luxury segment model (shown at the
far left in Table 3) demonstrates support for this
hypothesis. The coefficient for the proportion of
properties in the cluster with low differentiation is
negative and significant. Negative externalities are
associated with agglomeration in clusters of this
type for the highly differentiated luxury firms.
Size-based agglomeration effects were positive
and significant only in the economy, upscale, and
luxury segments, with no significant size-based ag-
glomeration effects found for hotels in the midscale
market segments. The controls for heterogeneity
were not significant except in the case of strategy
dispersion for luxury hotels and size dispersion for
economy hotels. Among the control variables, hotel
size (number of rooms) had significant effects on
revenue per available room for all but the upscale
segment, while positive effects were found in two
of the four other segments. The importance of the
variables associated with location and region var-
ied depending on the segment studied. Chain affil-
iation had a positive effect across the segments, but
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tended to be more important in the middle seg-
ments. This pattern may exist because it is harder
to create differences that appeal to consumers
while pursuing a middle-of-the-road strategy, so
brand affiliation becomes a more influential deter-
minant of perceived value.
In Hypothesis 2a, we predicted that firms pursu-
ing the lowest-cost strategic orientation would en-
TABLE 3
Results of FGLS Analysis for Influence of Differentiation-Based Agglomeration
on Revenue per Available Room
Variablesa Luxury Upscale
Midscale with
Food and
Beverage
Midscale with
No Food and
Beverage Economy Overall
Intercept 151.61**** 60.36**** 34.70**** 19.90**** 3.66 61.38****
Strategy-based agglomeration variables
Proportion of properties in cluster
pursuing high differentiation
0.49**** 0.44**** 0.30**** 0.20**** 0.13****
Proportion of properties in cluster
pursuing low cost
–0.83****
Size-based agglomeration variable
Proportion of larger properties 0.15* 0.12**** –0.01 0.00 0.06**** 0.03**
Heterogeneity in cluster variable
Dispersion of strategies 3.27* 0.91 0.73 0.49 0.22 0.61
Size dispersion 15.61 6.41 2.92 2.27 7.11** 11.66**
Individual hotel variables
Number of rooms –0.00 –0.00 0.02** –0.01* 0.03** 0.00
Chain affiliation 2.46 5.12** 3.27** 17.37**** 7.81**** 6.71****
Urban setting –23.83**** –7.88* –10.02**** –4.67* –6.17* –8.85****
Suburban setting –27.41**** –8.34** –12.95**** –6.61** –6.03* –9.46****
Airport setting –27.55**** –4.34 –12.16**** –6.13** –7.39** –9.44****
Highway setting –31.37**** –8.27* –12.76**** –8.32**** –8.85** –11.11****
Metropolitan Statistical Area variables
Population –0.00** –0.00* –0.00** –0.00** –0.00**** –0.00*
Land –0.00 –0.00* –0.00* –0.00 –0.00 –0.00*
Establishments 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**** 0.00**** 0.00**** 0.00**
Regional variables
Mid Atlantic 22.27** 6.11 11.01** 8.05* 7.68** 5.89
South Atlantic –3.17 –12.88** –3.74 –0.31 –0.73 –6.49*
Northern –4.69 –12.01** –2.18 0.31 –2.32 –7.20*
Southern –11.85 –17.68**** –5.19 –2.13 –2.65 –10.03**
West north central –7.65 –16.01**** –2.09 –2.06 –1.87 –8.62**
West south central –0.64 –13.27** –2.98 –1.20 –2.23 –8.19*
Mountain 1.92 –10.62 –3.69 –3.66 –1.04 –7.02*
Pacific 19.29 –0.28 6.59 5.82 8.30** 2.35
Segment variable
Midscale –24.87****
Midscale with no food and
beverage
–24.39****
Economy –43.70****
n 1,741 1,887 2,835 3,925 4,607 13,254
2 likelihood ratio 194.87 485.73 555.87 532.36 1,041.47 4,062.46
Pr  2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
* p  .05
** p  .01
**** p  .0001
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joy greater spillover effects to the extent that their
strategic orientations’ distance from the norm in
their clusters was high (an indication of a high
degree of differentiation in the cluster). For com-
pleteness, we calculated a strategic distance vari-
able for size of the lodging company also. In Table
4, the positive and significant coefficient for the
variable representing this distance in the economy
segment and in the midscale without food and bev-
erage segment provides evidence to support Hy-
pothesis 2a. The negative and significant coeffi-
cients for the distance measures in the three full-
service segments supports Hypothesis 2b, which
states that demand-based performance will de-
crease for firms pursuing the most highly differen-
tiated strategic orientations in terms of the distance
between their orientation and the average of the
cluster. The pattern of results is consistent with
negative effects for the full-service segments above
midscale (with food and beverage) and positive
TABLE 4
Results of FGLS Analysis of Influence of Strategic Distance on Revenue per Available Room
Variable Luxury Upscale
Midscale with no
Food and
Beverage
Midscale with Food
and Beverage Economy
Intercept 146.05**** –92.96**** 45.06**** 28.99**** 12.47**
Strategic distance variables
Distance between strategic
orientation of hotel and central
tendency in cluster
–26.90**** –16.63**** –10.64**** 11.02**** 8.88****
Distance between size of hotel and
central tendency in cluster
0.02 0.01 0.03**** 0.01 –0.00
Heterogeneity in cluster variables
Dispersion of strategies 3.69** 1.69* 1.44* 0.09 0.47**
Size dispersion 16.07* 5.07 10.66** 3.16 3.08
Individual hotel variables
Number of rooms –0.03 –0.03**** 0.02** –0.01** –0.01
Chain affiliation 0.29 4.82** 3.44** 17.55**** 7.37****
Urban setting –23.11**** –7.08* –9.62**** –4.98* –6.46*
Suburban setting –26.39**** –6.90* –13.15**** –6.72** –6.31**
Airport setting –26.55**** –2.88 –12.33**** –6.22** –7.67**
Highway setting –29.84**** –6.96* –13.10**** –8.52**** –9.09**
Metropolitan Statistical Area variables
Population –0.00* –0.00* –0.00** –0.00** –0.00****
Land –0.00 –0.00* –0.00* –0.00 –0.00
Establishments 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**** 0.00**** 0.00****
Regional variables
Mid Atlantic 23.59** 7.95 9.56** 7.65* 8.89**
South Atlantic 1.56 –9.29** –5.54 –2.20 0.83
Northern –1.66 –9.30* –4.65 –1.56 –0.29
Southern –5.25 –12.80** –8.55** –5.29* –0.42
West north central –3.06 –12.74** –4.93 –4.25 0.44
West south central 4.04 –9.39* –5.93 –2.82 –0.25
Mountain 3.46 –8.69* –4.88 –5.21* 0.37
Pacific 22.27** 1.40 4.79 4.79 7.99**
n 1,741 1,887 2,835 3,925 4,607
2 likelihood ratio 184.00 468.07 665.69 523.95 939.5
Pr  2 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
* p  .05
** p  .01
**** p  .0001
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effects for the limited service and less differenti-
ated segments. All of the effects were significant at
the .0001 level.
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND
CONCLUSION
The empirical tests provide evidence for both
positive and negative externalities of strategy-based
agglomeration. The results show that positive ag-
glomeration effects are caused mainly by benefits
from differentiation spillover to lower-end firms.
On the other hand, negative externalities of agglom-
eration are brought about by co-location in a cluster
with firms that pursue low-cost strategic orienta-
tion. In fact, the most highly differentiated compet-
itors appear to suffer the most from negative spill-
over if a high percentage of the other firms in their
clusters are pursuing low cost. The hypothesis tests
provide fairly strong evidence of the role of strate-
gic agglomeration in that the predicted agglomera-
tion effects were found across all strategic orienta-
tions. In addition, the reasonableness of the relative
magnitude of this measure for each strategic orien-
tation provides further support for the econometric
specification of this model. In general, pricing is
higher for highly differentiated firms than for low-
cost firms. The relative magnitude of the coefficient
is consistent with this fact in that the coefficient is
the highest for upscale and the lowest for economy.
The distance tests provide additional evidence be-
cause they demonstrate that the performance of a
firm pursuing a low-cost strategic orientation in-
creases as the average level of differentiation in its
competitive cluster increases. Similarly, highly dif-
ferentiated firms perform worse as the average level
of differentiation in their clusters decreases.
These findings have implications with regard to
the trade-offs firms make in choosing between dif-
ferentiation and cost leadership. For a differentia-
tion strategy to succeed, the additional revenue
generated as a result of creating differentiating fea-
tures has to exceed the additional costs of creating
those features (Porter, 1985: 153). However, differ-
entiation attempts can be problematic if the source
of differentiation provides benefits to competing
firms without requiring them to make the associ-
ated investments. If co-location reduces the ability
of high-end firms to distinguish themselves on fac-
tors other than location, then it is possible or even
probable that lower-end firms can enjoy some of
the demand advantages created by the higher-end
firms. In a low-tech service industry such as lodg-
ing, restaurants, or retail, high-end competitors
may have difficulty preventing low-end competi-
tors from entering the same market because entry
barriers are insufficient. The high-end firms may
also find that they provide the greatest spillover
benefits to the firms that are most likely to attract
their customers.
Our exploration of strategic distance revealed
that being different can amplify the positive benefit
for hotels with a low-cost strategic orientation.
Proximity to high-end firms gives a revenue boost
to limited-service providers, and the strategic dis-
tance magnifies the agglomeration benefits. For
highly differentiated service providers, the greater
their strategic distance from their cluster, the more
revenue-diminishing co-location can be. Our re-
sults reveal that the greater the low-cost orientation
of the cluster and the farther the distance of a
high-end firm from the average of this type of clus-
ter, the more undesirable co-location becomes. For
the highest-end, luxury hotels, finding locations
that are away from other hotels may be the best
advice.
We want to emphasize that our theory applies
most closely to service firms, for which location is
an especially critical variable for success, agglom-
eration is very common, and local competition is
fierce. Traditional production-based arguments for
agglomeration provide an excellent explanation for
co-location of manufacturing firms, but they do
little to explain the popularity of the phenomenon
in service firms. Our central arguments follow the
reasoning that service firms agglomerate, in part,
because of the expectation of increased demand.
Since our dependent variable is based on demand
effects, our results are consistent with this reason-
ing. However, there are two major types of demand-
based benefits. Heterogeneity makes a location
more attractive by reducing search costs through
providing consumers with more choices. Our re-
sults suggest that these advantages do not appear to
accrue to all competitors in a cluster.
To gain a clearer picture of firm-level spillover
effects, we controlled for cluster heterogeneity
based on both strategic orientation and size. Add-
ing these controls to our models also represented a
test of the idea that heterogeneity makes a location
more attractive. The results suggest that the disper-
sion or heterogeneity in strategies enhances the
performance of all but the limited-service midscale
segment but is strongest for luxury firms. Appar-
ently, high-end firms are best able to distinguish
themselves from firms pursuing a low-end strategy
if strategic heterogeneity is high. Size dispersion
has a positive effect for firms in the luxury and
full-service midscale segments. This result is inter-
esting in light of the work of Mazzeo (2002), who
found that there were incentives associated with
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being different from competitors in small roadside
motel markets. Size is one of many factors that can
make a firm different from its competitors.
Size-based agglomeration was used as a control
variable; however, it is interesting to note that we
observed the benefits of size-based agglomeration
for three of the five segment tests. For the most
highly differentiated firms (luxury and upscale),
performance was higher when they operated in
clusters of large firms. A similar effect was found
for firms pursuing the lowest-cost strategic orienta-
tion. These results both confirm and extend past
findings. Chung and Kalnins (2001) found that size-
based agglomeration influenced performance for
firms in rural areas, which would typically be low-
end properties. We discovered a similar size-based
agglomeration effect, but for both highly differenti-
ated firms and low-cost firms.
Most of the individual hotel control variables
were significant in the models. One of the most
important of these controls was chain affiliation.
We found a positive effect of chain affiliation in all
but the luxury segment. Firms that are perceived as
different from other firms in this category may have
enough appeal to wealthy consumers to counteract
the effects of not being associated with a brand.
They would tend to appeal to consumers more on
the basis of amenities and image than brand. The
benefits to firms with other strategic orientations
are clear. When firms affiliate with a brand, they
tap into multi-unit knowledge systems and stan-
dards honed by specialized corporate functional
experts (e.g., in HR and marketing), large labor
pools yielded by intrafirm career development
practices, and special inputs, such as global mar-
keting distribution channels, centralized account-
ing processes, and corporate training programs and
initiatives. Also, they share in the image of the
brand. Potential consumers know what to expect. A
fruitful area for future study would be to explore
the degree to which a multibrand organization
reaps agglomeration benefit from its own higher-
quality brands.
One of the major limitations of our study is that
its cross-sectional design did not allow examina-
tion of the formation of clusters. Early entrants to
any business often bear a disproportionate devel-
opment expense. Locating in a new market can be
expensive owing to the costs of training a local
workforce, obtaining necessary community support
and other factors such as building permits, and
building consumer awareness through promotion
and advertising. Our results might suggest that a
firm that is more interested in keeping costs low
can enter a market cluster later with relatively
lower expenses and still reap the advantages cre-
ated by early entrants. However, we did not test
this notion. A longitudinal test of this idea would
be appropriate (Kalnins & Chung, 2004).
Another weakness is that we were not able to
obtain profit data for our sample companies. How-
ever, as we noted previously, an independent test
indicated a fairly strong correlation between reve-
nue per available room and profit per available
room. Furthermore, our testing by quality segment
does account to some degree for cost differences.
For example, costs are likely to be more similar
within segments than across segments. Conse-
quently, although we have strong reason to believe
that the differentiation-based agglomeration effects
we discovered will influence profits similarly to
revenues, future research should examine this is-
sue more directly.
A possible limitation of this study is that the
results come from the lodging industry and may not
be generalizable to other industries. Nonetheless,
there is no reason to believe that the competitive
dynamics associated with differentiation spillover
found in this service industry will not be found
elsewhere, especially in other service industries. In
fact, there is even a manufacturing-based counter-
part to the idea of resource spillover. Shaver and
Flyer (2000), for example, suggested that larger new
manufacturing ventures had little incentive to clus-
ter with other firms in the same industries because
of their relatively strong resource positions. We
believe that the basic idea that the benefits of dif-
ferentiation are hard to deny to other competitors
in a cluster can be applied in many businesses,
particularly in services. In fact, proximity is not
necessarily confined to geography. It can be mea-
sured across many organizational dimensions or
traits (Baum & Mezias, 1992; Chung & Kalnins,
2001). Future research on similar phenomena in
other industries is necessary to confirm these find-
ings. Nonetheless, a focus on one industry in this
study allowed the sample to be divided into seg-
ments based on strategic orientation, a necessary
precondition to testing the hypotheses.
In addition, a possible bias could exist owing to
endogeneity between the location decisions hotel
companies were making and their cluster-based
performance (Shaver, 1998). However, we do not
believe that the problem Shaver identified was
likely to have been serious in our study. In his
conclusion, he stated, “Second, to the extent that
mistakes are common, the factors that make one
strategy more attractive than another are not well
understood by decision makers, or all determinants
of performance can be identified and measured,
self-selection will not affect the estimates of strat-
egy performance” (Shaver, 1998: 584). We believe
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that factors associated with selecting a particular
cluster are not well understood by decision makers,
especially the primary factor we were examining in
this study (the influence of the proportion of com-
petitors pursuing a high level of differentiation).
Part of our belief stems from the counterintuitive
nature of what we are saying. It is somewhat coun-
terintuitive to think that performance can increase
by clustering close to competitor firms. Also, we
included a large set of control variables that repre-
sent other location-related factors that influence
performance. Their inclusion should help mitigate
possible bias.
The practical implications of this study are that
low-end competitors benefit from locating near dif-
ferentiated firms (positive spillover occurs), while
high-end firms lose value from locating near lower-
end competitors (negative spillover occurs). With
regard to positive spillover, consider a midscale
firm with food and beverage services that is located
in a cluster in which 40 percent of its competitors
have high-quality strategic orientations. Compare
this picture to one in which a midscale firm (also
with food and beverages) is located in a cluster in
which 75 percent of its competitors are in the high-
quality segments. The difference of 35 percent
(75% minus 40%) can be multiplied by the coeffi-
cient of .44 (see Table 3) and then by 365 days per
year to determine the incremental potential benefit
to the firm in the more densely high-quality cluster.
The difference is $5,587.79. If we multiply this
figure by the average hotel size of 144 rooms, the
potential benefit is over $800,000 per year. Low-
tech service industries tend to be fiercely compet-
itive, with tight margins in many instances. Conse-
quently, these results have managerial as well as
statistical significance, especially considering that
we controlled for so many other factors that influ-
ence demand. Of course, as differences across clus-
ters increase or diminish, these numbers will vary.
Also, the coefficient varies from segment to seg-
ment, with the strongest effects in the luxury seg-
ment and the lowest in the economy classification.
In addition, it is interesting that the coefficient for
the luxury category is .83 in the lower-cost spill-
over test, which is nearly double the next highest
coefficient. Basically, the results suggest that to
obtain higher performance, firms should try to lo-
cate near higher-end and away from lower-end
competitors. This finding is consistent with
Kalnins and Chung’s (2004) finding that new hotels
tended to locate near branded upscale hotels and
that owners of upscale hotels tended to avoid areas
without similar resources.
In conclusion, we found that, in a service indus-
try context, revenue performance was enhanced by
co-locating in a market cluster with firms pursuing
high differentiation. We attributed this agglomera-
tion effect to differentiation-based spillover. We
also found evidence of negative spillover as firms
located among competitors pursuing low-cost stra-
tegic orientation. Furthermore, we found that being
strategically distant from the average strategy of
their cluster could amplify the positive benefit for
low-cost hotels but harm highly differentiated ho-
tels. Chain affiliation was found to be helpful to
hotels across the segments, with the largest effects
occurring in the middle strategies. The bottom line
is that although some firms may bear dispropor-
tionate costs associated with differentiating their
products or services, other firms can share in the
benefits from such differentiation.
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